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REGIONAL GROWTH CONVER-




Introduction: Policy objectives and the agenda
Regional growth and its convergence has been on
the top of the EU policy agenda since the first pro-
gramming period of EU Structural Funds, 1989 to
1993. Over years and programming periods, the
reduction of the existing gap between countries and
regions in terms of per capita GDP remained one the
most important policy objectives of the EU. Apart
from the change in its denomination (from
“Objective 1” to “Convergence Objective”), the cur-
rent programming period also confirms this priority:
the largest part of financial resources is going to be
spent in lagging regions and, if we also include the
Cohesion Fund, in lagging member states.
Given this emphasis of EU policy on the regional
growth divide (for simplicity,cohesion policy),it may
be surprising to realize after almost 20 years that
empirical evidence on its impact is still controversial
and, in fact, incomplete. Whether growth conver-
gence really occurred in the EU and whether cohe-
sion policy played a significant positive role in this
respect is an empirical question, to which no conclu-
sive answer can be provided at the moment.
Moreover, hardly any empirical evidence exists
regarding the question whether the relevant EU
policies as a whole – i.e. the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) included – actually induced a reduc-
tion of the growth gap, since the combination and
interaction of different types of policies and their
measures could eventually offset any economic
effects caused by individual measures.
The Fourth Cohesion Report released by the
European Commission last year as well as its prede-
cessors offer an optimistic view in this respect
(European Commission 2001, 2004 and 2007).
Generally speaking, growth convergence across
regions and states in the EU has been presented as a
well-established evidence in these reports. Taking a
wider look at the existing empirical literature, how-
ever, sheds a different light on this subject: results
are often controversial and suffer from some serious
methodological and data limitations. In particular,
whenever cohesion policy is evaluated with respect
to the observed growth convergence, it is implicitly
assumed that all other EU (as well as national and
regional) policies are irrelevant. For instance, this is
the case of the CAP,for which very little is said about
its possible effect on growth processes, although this
subsidy still represents the main form of financial
support transferred from the EU to the regions.
Over the third programming period from 1989 to
2006,the CAP accounted for 45% of the EU budget,
compared to 25% for cohesion policy. During the
current programming period, these shares are
expected to move progressively closer and their
positions will be inverted by 2013, while the sum of
the two will still remain at about 70% of the EU bud-
get. In September 2007, President Barroso launched
the public debate on “Budget Review”, the process
be which the EU is to redesign its policy and spend-
ing priorities for the coming programming period of
2014 to 2020.Commissioner Grybauskaite (responsi-
ble for Financial Programming and Budget) explicit-
ly acknowledged that the current budget allocation
is clearly in conflict with the real EU priorities,being
in fact mainly an expression of old and almost com-
pletely out-of-date objectives. The CAP is evidently
at the centre of this debate for being inconsistent –
and even conflicting – with the overall growth and
convergence objectives of the EU. In contrast, struc-
tural policies are (at least implicitly) assumed to pro-
vide good performance and, consequently, should
gain room relative to the “old” and ineffective CAP.
This perspective might explain the discontent about
the current EU budget allocation.
This article will present an overview of the empirical
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growth performance and convergence, and will
assess whether such widely shared opinion is actual-
ly supported by the facts.
Existing empirical findings and their inconsistency
The Fourth Cohesion Report (European Commis-
sion 2007) addresses the evaluation of the impact of
structural funds on EU regional economies. Such
assessment, in fact, mostly concerns the last pro-
gramming period (2000 to 2006) and also aims at
providing a first ex ante evaluation of the current
programming period (2007 to 2013). The empirical
evidence on which the report establishes its conclu-
sions, however, is mainly obtained from three
macro-economic models, HERMIN, QUEST and
EcoMod. These models demonstrate a significant
positive impact of Structural Funds (Cohesion
Funds included) on the growth of lagging regions
and states, thus promoting convergence. However,
the computed size of this impulse, as well as the
speed of convergence it induces, appreciably differs
across the models.
In fact, evidence provided by such models, based on
simulations rather than econometric estimations of
the impact, is of major interest as an ex ante and in
itinere evaluation tool. But they can hardy provide a
clear ex post demonstration of the effect such poli-
cies have really had on growth. In other words, they
cannot say much about whether growth convergence
actually occurred over a long period of time and
whether such a process has been actually fostered by
structural policies.The major strength of macro-eco-
nomic models can also be their main drawback.They
are designed to fully represent the impact of policies
on both the demand and supply sides of the econo-
my, and both the short-run and the longer-run
impacts (Bradley et al. 1995 and 2003). Nonetheless,
the real interest in growth empirics is only on those
supply side impacts that eventually produce the
long-term,namely permanent,effects on growth per-
formances.
Evaluating the impact of Structural and Cohesion
Funds may definitely involve many other relevant
issues and the above-mentioned macro-economic
models represent excellent instruments in this
respect.1 Nevertheless,we must also acknowledge,in
the words of the European Commission, that “trans-
fers from the Structural Funds added directly to
demand and economic activity, but more important-
ly, since they were concentrated on investment [. . .],
they were aimed at increasing growth potential in
the medium and long term.[...] The estimates of the
“supply-side” effects on growth [. . .] become pre-
dominant in the long term. [. . .] Although structural
policies are ultimately judged in terms of their effect
in narrowing regional disparities in GDP per head of
employment,it is their impact on the underlying fac-
tors which determine economic development”
(European Commission 2001, 131).
As a consequence, firstly, a correct evaluation in this
respect should be performed over a long enough
period of time (namely,more than one programming
period). Secondly, whenever the main objective of
policy evaluation concentrates on these long-term
and persistent effects on the supply side of regional
economies, approaches exclusively targeting on such
aspects may indeed be preferable. If we agree that
the key  objective of evaluation is the long-term sup-
ply-side effect eventually generating persistent
growth and its convergence,we may understand why
several empirical studies evaluate these policies
within a neoclassical conditional growth conver-
gence framework.This framework admits an empiri-
cally tractable, and relatively straightforward, model
specification that allows the estimation of growth-
enhancing effects over a large-enough number of
years and regions or countries.
This empirical approach is also adopted in previous
Cohesion Reports for the evaluation of “Objective 1
Structural Funds”. The Third Cohesion Report
(European Commission 2004) provides an uncondi-
tional convergence rate estimate of 0.5 percent for
the 1980 to 1988 period over the whole EU area;this
rate increases to 0.7 and 0.9 percent in periods 1989
to 1993 and 1994 to 2000, respectively. During these
two programming periods the convergence rate
observed only across Objective 1 regions has been
much higher,at 3.1 and 1.6 percent,respectively.This
latter evidence,in fact,would demonstrate a positive
impact of Structural Funds on this convergence
process.
The almost contemporaneous “Sapir Report” (Sapir
et al. 2004) is actually less optimistic in this respect
than several empirical studies. In spite of an analo-
gous growth convergence framework adopted, this
report provides fairly different empirical findings.
1 A more complete picture on the whole set of issues, as well as
approaches, about the EU structural policy evaluation is also pro-
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Moreover,in this report the possible negative role of
the CAP on growth is mentioned parallel to the
growth-enhancing impact of Structural Funds,
although it is not clarified how this contrasting effect
could be actually generated. Among various
Cohesion Reports published, the latest one
(European Commission 2007) actually refers to the
likely contribution of the CAP to regional cohesion,
with the conclusion that the distribution of CAP
funds seems to favour richer regions in the case of
the first pillar (i.e. expenditures related to market
support and direct payment to farmers), and is less
related to regional growth levels in the case of the
second pillar (i.e.expenditures related to rural devel-
opment-oriented accompanying measures, invest-
ment in holdings, agri-tourism, etc.). This evidence,
extensively analysed in Shucksmith et al. (2005),
would suggest some relevant implications of the
CAP on growth convergence and cohesion across
EU territories. On this, however, more in-depth
empirical analysis is still lacking.
Taking a wider look at the empirical evidence on
growth convergence across the EU and the role of
policies indeed confirms that a conclusive answer can
hardly be given (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996;
Neven and Gouyette 1995).The large body of studies
(in the order of hundreds) on growth convergence
across EU regions and countries provides mixed and
controversial results.This may be caused by the large
number of different model specifications, data (for
instance, period under investigation) and economet-
ric methods used in this literature. Croci Angelini
(2002) surveyed 16 different estimations of “uncon-
ditional” β-convergence across the EU published
from 1992 to 2000; the convergence rate varies
between 0.4 and 2.9 percent,but several studies actu-
ally provide evidence against regional convergence
(Abraham and Van Rompuy 1995; Molle and
Boeckhout 1995). Adopting a panel and dynamic
specification, Canova and Marcet (1995) report a
very high convergence speed (about 11 percent for
countries and 23 percent for regions in the EU),
while, expressed again in specific statistical terms,
other studies do not show any clear evidence of
“unconditional” convergence (Boldrin and Canova
2001). Within this approach, the “conditional” con-
vergence is strongly supported by some empirical
works, while contested by others. Moreover, several
empirical studies are also consistent with the so-
called “club”-convergence which is the convergence
observed within subgroups of regions (Chatterji
1993; Quah 1996; Canova 1999).
Within this large amount of empirical literature,
Dall’erba and de Groot (2006) review eleven papers
focusing on the impact of Objective 1 Structural
Funds on growth convergence. In all these cases, the
period under investigation at maximum covers the
two programming periods from 1989 to 1999,as final
data on 2000 to 2006 payments were only recently
released (European Commission 2007). Except for
Rodrìguez-Pose and Fratesi (2002), Bivand and
Brunstad (2003) and Esposti (2007), none of these
studies acknowledges a possible role of the CAP
payments.These eleven papers report the impressive
number of 200 different estimates of the impact of
Structural Funds on regional growth. On average,
the estimated impact is small,though positive,but an
extreme variability is observed.Eight papers admit a
negative impact, while a mean negative effect is
obtained in four papers. Moreover, the Structural
Fund payments enter the conditional growth conver-
gence model according to ad hoc, thus arbitrary,
specifications. Consequently, comparability across
results is highly questionable.
Differences in data under consideration may also
explain such major disparities. For instance, in
order to evaluate the Objective 1 Structural Funds,
Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) apply the growth
convergence model to the EU15 countries and not
to regions – the actual recipients of these funds.
Moreover, they specify the policy support in terms
of a growth rate instead of the level, the former
apparently being much less regular and potentially
more statistically “noisy” over a short period of
time.In addition,these empirical studies often con-
centrate on different time periods. Cappelen et al.
(2003) consider a long time period (1980 to 1997),
but they evaluate structural policy by limiting the
estimation to the “treatment” years from 1989 to
1997. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) examine
the period of 1995 to 2001. Rodrìguez-Pose and
Fratesi (2002) investigate the whole 1989 to 1999
period but they also estimate the conditional con-
vergence for the 1989 to 1993 and the 1994 to 1999
sub-periods.
In most of these applications, as mentioned before,
the CAP expenditure is not taken into account.This
can be also explained by the fact that analysis of the
territorial or regional impact of CAP has become a
major research concern only in the last fifteen years
(Sotte 1995; Laurent and Bowler 1997; Shucksmith,
Thomson and Roberts 2005).The main finding often
reported is the positive – or at least not significantlyCESifo Forum 1/2008 17
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negative – statistical correlation between first pillar
CAP expenditure per unit of agricultural land (or
labour) and regional per capita GDP (Shucksmith,
Thomson and Roberts 2005).2 If we consider the
“CAP intensity” (i.e. the CAP expenditure per unit
of GDP) and both pillars’ payments, we actually do
not observe any relation with regional per capita
GDP (Figure 1). This is the distributional argument
on the inconsistency of CAP with the economic and
social cohesion objectives of the EU (Tarditi and
Zanias 2001).
In any case, this does not necessarily imply that the
CAP offsets, even partially, structural policies and
thus acts as a counter-treatment (the counter-treat-
ment hypothesis, see Esposti 2008). Explicitly test-
ing whether the CAP actually acts against cohesion
policy requires a more careful approach,as we need
to model how the CAP interferes with structural
policies in affecting regional growth processes.The
use of an appropriate theoretical framework to
analyze the CAP’s possible inconsistency with
regional cohesion has been, in fact, suggested by
some recent empirical work (Rodrìguez-Pose and
Fratesi 2002; Bivand and Brunstad 2003; Esposti
2007). Yet their results are controversial and, as a
matter of fact, not fully comparable. Also in these
cases, the inclusion of CAP payments in conven-
tional conditional growth convergence is largely ad
hoc. Moreover, the construction of a complete and
consistent regional dataset for CAP payments is




We wonder why an apparently
simple research question – Do
cohesion policy and the CAP
affect regional growth and
growth convergence? – within a
well-established and widely
adopted theoretical framework
(the “neoclassical growth con-
vergence model”) generates so
different and controversial re-
sults.There are three sets of fun-
damental issues on which empir-
ical research has not provided a
conclusive answer so far: (i) how
the conditional convergence model has to be appro-
priately augmented to include EU policies;(ii) which
policy data are actually available; and (iii) what
appropriate econometric techniques are required to
estimate policy impacts.
As mentioned above, most empirical studies include
policy support by augmenting the growth conver-
gence model with largely arbitrary solutions. This
happens because it is not so obvious on which
growth conditioning variables the cohesion policy
and the CAP actually intervene.About fifteen years
ago,two seminal empirical works by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) rigorously
derived the conventional linear regression specifica-
tion of growth convergence from the transition
dynamics of the neoclassical growth model (in both
the Solow-Swan and Cass-Koopmans versions). In
this “formal” or “model-based” specification of the
growth convergence model, per capita GDP growth
depends on the initial per capita income level,as well
as on other conditioning variables,these being strict-
ly and exclusively justified by the underlying theo-
retical framework. Accordingly, the conditional 
β-convergence model takes this form:
(1) 
On the left-hand side,yit is the i-th region’s (or coun-
try) per capita (or per unit of labour) income growth
rate over period t; Yi0 is the i-th region’s initial (at
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RELATION BETWEEN REGIONAL CAP EXPENDITURE INTENSITY
 AND GDP 
 Values in PPS, 1999
CAP intensity (S)
Figure 1
2 Though this conclusion is based on the CAP before the 2003
reform there is evidence suggesting that such a reform is not doing
very much to remove this inconsistency (Shucksmith,Thomson and
Roberts 2005).
Ey itYi0, Xi0 () = tg+ 1e









ln ni0+g+ ()  1e
t () lnYi0CESifo Forum 1/2008 18
Focus
conditioning variables. The right-hand side makes
explicit the whole set of these conditioning variables
Xi0; g is the total factor productivity (TFP) growth
rate; λ is the speed (or rate) of convergence with 
expected to be < 0 for β-convergence to occur; Ai0 is
the i-th region’s initial TFP; 0 < α < 1 is the coeffi-
cient (indicating the capital share or capital intensity
within the economy) of the underlying Cobb-
Douglas production function with two factors (capi-
tal K and labour L) and constant returns to scale; si0
is the i-th region’s initial investment rate; ni0 is the i-
th region’s initial population (or employment)
growth rate; δ is the capital depreciation rate.
According to the underlying neoclassical growth
model, however, g, δ, α and λ are usually assumed
to be constant across regions and over time. Thus,
the remaining really conditional variables beside
Yi0 are Ai0, si0 and ni0.These are the only legitimate
conditioning variables in this conditional conver-
gence model.As equation (1) describes the region-
al growth convergence pattern toward the respec-
tive steady-state, it implies different regional
steady-states, therefore the conditional conver-
gence, whenever regions show different condition-
ing variables.
Augmenting equation (1) to include policy variables
thus means to ask how policies affect one of the con-
ditioning variables Ai0,si0 and ni0.In this respect,two
different modelling solutions can be proposed for
the Structural Funds and the CAP payments,respec-
tively. The former makes capital formation within
equation (1) explicit (Esposti and Bussoletti 2008);
the latter obtains an alternative specification of
equation (1) from a two-sector balanced growth
model (Esposti 2007).
As far as the Structural Funds are concerned, the
most natural way to include them into a regional
growth convergence model is through the invest-
ment rate si0.After all, it should be fairly obvious to
regard the Objective 1 Structural Funds as invest-
ments, given that most of them (92% in the whole
1989 to 1999 period, 98% in the 1994 to 1999 pro-
gramming period) aim at building regional stock in
three different areas: infrastructure; human capital;
other (mainly private) investments including in
R&D (European Commission 2001 and 2004;
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004).According to this
straightforward argument, these funds may be inter-
preted as an increase of the capital stock in the unit
of time, i.e.
,
and, consequently, of the investment rate
, where Y
_
is the regional GDP.
Considering the Structural Funds expenditure as
capital accumulation also has the advantage to allow
modelling the different effects of the aforemen-
tioned areas of intervention (infrastructure, human
capital and R&D, for instance), and how they inter-
act in shaping the growth convergence process. In
some studies, structural policy itself is explicitly dis-
tinguished among these different investment cate-
gories, but this is done only at the country level or
considering single regional cases (Bradley et al.2003;
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). Unfortunately, in
fact, current available data do not allow attributing
the whole Objective 1 expenditure to different
investments at the regional level.However,it is often
neither possible nor appropriate to associate the
expenditure of a given EU Structural Fund to a spe-
cific investment typology. One possible way to pro-
ceed, therefore, is to model at the regional level the
interaction between the overall amount of policy
expenditure and the different capital assets (infra-
structure, human capital, R&D), or some proxies of
them, as this interaction depends on the underlying
unobserved share of structural funds invested in that
specific asset.
These aspects can thus be modelled by specifying a
capital formation function. Firstly, we can cumulate
past expenditure in new capital formation as a
weighted sum of past policy expenditure per capita
(or labour unit) within the region, that is 
,
where ws is the weight indicating the “portion”of the
policy expenditure M, delivered at time t-s and
affecting the outcome at time t, and Z is the maxi-
mum time lag. Secondly, we can specify a relation
between the regional investment rate s and this pol-
icy treatment, representing how this public expendi-
ture converts into the above-mentioned different
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(2)
where  Ii0 = initial regional infrastructure endow-
ment; Hi0 = initial human capital in the i-th region;
RDi0 = initial regional R&D expenditure per capita
(or labour unit).
By substituting equation (2) in equation (1), we
obtain an augmented growth convergence model
where the impact of Structural Funds on growth and
conditional convergence (by affecting the regional
steady-state) and, in addition, this impact is actually
allowed to differ across regions or groups of regions.
This difference may occur either for the different
amount of funds but also for the different initial
resource endowment across regions in terms of
infrastructure, human and knowledge capital, with
which structural funds themselves interact.
It is less obvious how to include the regional CAP
expenditure in the conventional growth convergence
model. The basic idea is that the CAP, as any other
sectoral policy, may influence the growth process
because it is directly related to the share of agricul-
ture. The underlying hypothesis is that growth in
poorer regions is greatly hampered by an un-
favourable sectoral structure dominated by agricul-
ture (Cappelen et al. 2003). The formal conditional
convergence model shown in equation (1), however,
receives sound theoretical justification from the one-
sector neoclassical growth model. One possible way
to proceed is to enter multiple sectors through term
Ai0 in equation (1). The general idea can be simpli-
fied as follows:(i) assume that the regional economy
is made of two sectors, agriculture (F) and non-agri-
culture (N); (ii) the share of F is related to the CAP
expenditure within the region; and (iii) Ai0 then
depends on the shares of the two sectors, therefore
on the CAP expenditure itself.
By formulating a two-sector balanced growth model
it is possible to express ln Ai0 as a function of the
CAP expenditure as follows (Esposti 2007):
(3)
.
where  di0 expresses the agricultural technological
gap, i.e. the difference between the TFP of sectors N
and F;Si0 is the regional CAP expenditure per unit of
GDP or CAP intensity;
is the share of agriculture on regional employ-
ment;α and α’ are capital intensities in sectors N and
F, respectively. By substituting equation (3) in equa-
tion (1),it becomes clear that,through different TFP
levels, steady-state levels as well as convergence
process itself are allowed to differ across regions as a
consequence of different CAP intensity and agricul-
tural employment share. Moreover, together with
equation (2), equation (3) also provides the testing
possibilities regarding whether the regional CAP
expenditure really counteracts the effect of structur-
al funds, thus assuming the above-mentioned
counter-treatment hypothesis (Esposti 2007).
Introducing EU policies in equation (1) as an appro-
priate augmentation of the base model, however,
does not necessarily ensure more robust and concor-
dant results from different empirical applications.
Some further data and estimation issues remain.
Among the former issues, we may mention the lack
of official datasets containing policy data at the
regional level. EU institutions do not provide the
harmonized and long-term series of Structural Fund
payments at the EU regional level.This information
can indeed be reconstructed from EU and regional
documentation but actual comparability of data
across regions and over years is highly questionable.
Without a shared and univocal solution in this
respect, researchers adopt arbitrary or ad hoc solu-
tions. This is the case with Multiregional Funds that
are a very important part of the whole Objective 1
Structural Fund payments over the period 1989 to
1999 (Table 1), but their actual distribution across
regions is unknown. Consequently, they are ignored
in some applications or distributed proportionally in
other cases. Yet both solutions may eventually lead
to biased empirical results.
Analogously, information is lacking on the time
when these funds actually generate investments
within the region and when they finally produce an
impact on growth (i.e. how to compute the term
above). Available information often reports years
when political decision on fund allocation is taken
but not when funds are actually spent within the
regional economy.This is evident when one looks at
the remarkable and increasing volatility of annual
expenditure observed over years 1989 to 1999
(Table 1).Also the attribution of funds across prior-
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ities or items (infrastructure, human capital, etc.) is
almost completely lacking as mentioned before.
And, if available, it does not necessarily represent
the actual expenditure made at the local level.
This incomplete information on policy implementa-
tion at regional level is even more severe for the
CAP. Building a regional dataset of the CAP expen-
diture is complex and controversial. With respect to
the CAP support, previous studies have calculated a
regionalized producer support estimate (PSE). This
might be appropriate because, at least in the past, a
large part of the support granted by the CAP was not
delivered directly in the form of subsidies but
through market price support. Unfortunately, defin-
ing the PSE at regional level is particularly complex
(Tarditi and Zanias 2001;Anders et al. 2004).
Even if only the explicit and direct CAP supports
were considered, serious problems would still be
encountered. Firstly, this amount should include
either the first and second pillar payments. However,
the second pillar payments cannot always be regard-
ed as constituting support of agricultural income
(Shucksmith, Thomson and Roberts 2005) and, in
previous programming periods and in the Objective 1
regions, a part of the structural CAP support was
delivered together with the Structural Funds, so that
they cannot be distinguished or separated. In any
case, the European Commission does not provide
regional series of the first pillar payments. EURO-
STAT provides NUTS II-level
series of agricultural subsidies,
but these subsidies cannot be
directly and univocally treated as
the first pillar CAP expenditure,
although they have been used as
such in previous work on the
regional impact of the CAP
(Bivand and Brunstad 2003).
Therefore, as Shucksmith,Thom-
son and Roberts (2005) suggest,
the only consistent source of the
CAP payments appears to be
FADN (Farm Accountancy Data
Network), which unfortunately
does not cover the whole post-
1989 period and may not be fully
representative of the actual CAP
payments granted to the entire
regional agriculture.
Estimation issues are a major
source of highly volatile empirical results, too. The
first aspect to be considered is that the use of panel
data, instead of more traditional cross-sectional
ones, has become prevalent in growth convergence
studies. Islam (2003) details the main advantages of
panel data in growth convergence studies; in such
context, dynamic panel-data specifications are
increasingly adopted (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort
1996; Yudong and Weeks 2000; Carmeci and Mauro
2003), with some recent applications also to evalua-
tion of Objective 1 expenditure (Beugelsdijk and
Eijffinger 2005; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008). Such
dynamic models explicitly take into account the ser-
ial correlation which often affects growth figures,
especially in the short term.
Therefore, the use of dynamic panel specifications
should significantly improve robustness and consis-
tency of convergence model estimations. However,
these formulations may raise further empirical
issues as well. In particular, a major problem is the
short frequency of data with respect to the medium
or long-term horizon of the estimated relations (see
Islam 2003). Moreover, these models involve the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estima-
tors, small-sample performance of which is often
unpredictable.And these problems may be particu-
larly critical when panels with many cross-sectional
observations in a form of short-time series are in
use – this is evidently the case of Structural Funds
across EU regions. Eventually, the relevance of all
these econometric concerns is revealed by the sys-
Table 1 
Statistical dispersion of per capita Structural Fund payments (in PPS)
in Objective 1 regions, 1989 to 1999 – CV expressed in %















1989 45  148.9  45.0  57.7  104.3 
1990 45  188.0  47.6  108.4  193.7 
1991 51  149.8  42.9  65.2  122.1 
1992 51  221.4  33.3  89.4  147.5 
1993 51  231.7  42.9  58.7  106.8 
1994 58  342.5  61.8  230.9  314.0 
1995 58  287.4  53.9  105.4  137.9 
1996 58  356.0  64.3  220.6  280.2 
1997 57  344.4  57.3  162.3  217.4 
1998 57  443.2  64.5  175.3  227.2 
1999 57  336.8  52.6  95.5  140.6 
Source: Esposti and Bussoletti (2008).CESifo Forum 1/2008 21
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tematic differences emerging between panel-data
and cross-sectional studies, as well as dynamic and
static specifications. Different choices of moment
restrictions and instruments in performing the
GMM estimations may also generate systematically
different estimates.
Some concluding remarks
On all these open issues, empirical research is
expected to make some progress in coming years.
This could be greatly supported by the availability
of updated statistical information on both growth
performance and policy expenditure over the pro-
gramming periods 2000 to 2006 and later 2007 to
2013. Despite these longer time series, however, it
must be also noted that the inclusion of regions of
new EU Member States will remain particularly dif-
ficult, as policy data will inevitably cover only few
years, and reliability of regional growth data before
accession is often questionable. Moreover, better
and more detailed information on regional expendi-
ture granted through EU policies has still to be pro-
vided, especially for the CAP, which will not be
available either for the periods 2000 to 2006 and
2007 to 2013.
Aside from these improvements,empirical research
on regional growth convergence across the EU is
also expected to take care of relevant theoretical
and empirical aspects almost completely disregard-
ed in the empirical literature so far. One of them
involves the extreme regional heterogeneity now
observed across the EU27 in terms of initial capital
endowment, sector structure and EU policy imple-
mentation. This heterogeneity is often neglected
even in panel-data applications, although it should
be more explicitly included in the formal model
specification. Related to this, one should also con-
sider the cross-sectional dependence which often
occurs across regions, but is quite often ruled out in
empirical studies.The spatial dependence of growth
performance and conditioning policy variables not
only raises critical estimation issues but also con-
cerns the representation of regional growth
processes and policy impacts within the formal con-
vergence model (Byrne et al. 2008). Badinger et al.
(2004) suggests the cross-regional dependence
within a conditional convergence model but also
admits that a consistent estimator considering the
correlation over time and across space at once is
currently lacking.
The proposed integration of EU policies in the con-
ventional convergence model may also be further
improved. First of all, most studies discussed above
exclusively analyse the policy impact within the β-
convergence framework, thus assuming that such
impact occurs in the region-specific steady-state sit-
uation. This does not seem to fully consider the
aspect which is more plausible related to the inten-
tions of policy makers – namely that policy actually
affects convergence speed,i.e.the β parameter itself.
Nevertheless, policies directly affecting β might not
be appropriately represented within the convention-
al neoclassical growth framework.Other approaches
should thus be developed in this respect (Croci
Angelini 2002), aimed at exploring appropriate links
with the above-mentioned macro-economic models.
More generally, it would be helpful to re-design the
analysis of the policy impact on regional growth per-
formance taking into account all possible policies
contributing to the final outcome, as many of them
are actually often ignored.For instance,in evaluating
the impact of Structural Funds on former Ob-
jective 1 regions, those still granted to Non-
Objective 1 territories as well as Cohesion Funds
flowing into the lagging countries (and, consequent-
ly, to their regions) in the EU, are often neglected.
Making a policy evaluation in terms of the “treat-
ment effects” (Esposti 2007) would require a more
careful consideration of all “treatments” actually
contributing to generate (or to counteract) such
effects as well as of all methodological implications
suggested by the so-called treatment-effect literature
(Frölich 2004).
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